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FAIR REPRESENTATION BY A UNION:
A FEDERAL RIGHT IN NEED OF A FEDERAL STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency, employees are bringing suit in federal
courts against their unions for failing to represent them adequately in
collective bargaining with their employers and in the administration
of collective bargaining agreements. I No statute expressly states that a
union has a duty to represent its members fairly.2 Nevertheless, courts
have imposed a duty of fair representation on unions 3 because a union
chosen by a majority of employees is granted the exclusive right to act
as bargaining agent for all employees in that bargaining unit. 4 Under
1. T. Boyce, Fair Representation, The NLRB, and The Courts 3 (1978); Hickey
& Murphy, Limitation Periods of § 301 Suits Need Clarification, Legal Times, Nov.
8, 1982, at 16, col. 1; Sachs & Gurewitz, Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 61
Mich. B.J. 526, 526 (1982); Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of
Fair Representation: Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 Vill. L. Rev. 885, 917
(1974); see, e.g., Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1982)
(failure to process pension claim adequately); Waiters Union, Local 781 v. Hotel
Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (failure to consider members' interests
before negotiating a collective bargaining agreement); Dent v. United States Postal
Serv., 538 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (failure to enforce the collective
bargaining agreement); Lake v. Martin Marietta Corp., 538 F. Supp. 725, 726
(M.D. Fla. 1982) (failure to process grievance on time).
2. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 604 n.9 (1983) (White,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d
302, 305 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953); R. Gorman, Basic Text on
Labor Law 724-25 (1976).
3. The duty of fair representation was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944), a case decided under
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). It was later applied to a case
arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980), in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953). See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); T. Boyce, supra note 1, at 3-6; R. Gorman, supra
note 2, at 695-98; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VilL L. Rev. 151, 151-53
(1957); Grenig, The Statute of Limitations in Fair Representation Cases, 33 Lab.
L.J. 483, 483 (1982).
4. Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides in relevant part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair
Representation-Steele and Its Successors, 30 Fed. B.J. 280, 280 (1971); Note, Stat-
utes of Limitations When Section 301 and Fair Representation Claims Are Joined:
Must They Be the Same?, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 1058, 1059 & n.7 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Must They Be the Same?]; Note, Statutes of Limitations Governing Fair
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the terms of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 5 employees
surrender certain individual rights and interests to their union for the
good of the collective whole. 6 A union, therefore, has a responsibility
"to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimina-
tion toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith
and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."' 7 When a union
breaches this duty by acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad
faith manner," an injured employee may bring an action in state or
federal court or before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).9
Just as no statute imposes this duty, no statute sets any limitation
period within which the injured employee must bring his suit for
breach of the duty of fair representation.' 0 As a result, courts have
taken various approaches in deciding which limitation to apply. This
has led to the adoption of several different time periods, depending on
the manner in which the action is characterized," the jurisdiction in
which the action is brought' 2 and whether it is brought in conjunction
Representation Action Against Union When Brought with Section 301 Action Against
Employer, 44 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 418, 419 (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
6. Id. § 157 (1976) (union may require "membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment"); see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1975) (concerted activity to coerce employer
in circumvention of union is not protected); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175, 180-81 (1967) (labor policy "extinguishes the individual employee's power
to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen
representative"); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (individual
employment contracts must yield to collective bargaining agreement); Cox, supra
note 3, at 151-52 (only the union can arrange the terms and conditions of employ-
ment).
7. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
8. Id. at 190; accord Alexander v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624
F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1980); Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's
Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 455 (2d Cir. 1979); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,
523 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 1975).
9. Grenig, supra note 3, at 486; Sachs & Gurewitz, supra note 1, at 528; see
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1967); R. Gorman, supra note 2, at 698-705.
10. Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir.
1978); Butler v. Local Union 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 446 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 857 (D.N.H. 1981); R. Gorman, supra note
2, at 724-25; Must They Be the Same?, supra note 4, at 1061.
11. Compare Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire Local of the Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying six-year period for liability
created by statute) with King v. Corn Prods., 538 F. Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(applying 10-year statute for written contracts) with Walsh v. Boss Linco Lines, 537
F. Supp. 363, 363-64 (D.N.J. 1981) (applying 90-day statute to vacate arbitration
awards).
12. Compare King v. Corn Prods., 538 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (N.D. I1. 1982)
(applying Illinois 10-year statute for breach of contract) with Kennedy v. Wheeling-
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with a related action against the employer. 13 The statutory periods
that have been adopted include those for breach of both oral' 4 and
written 15 contract, tort,16 including malpractice,17 liability created by
statute,'8 vacation of arbitration awards 19 and bringing unfair labor
practice charges before the NLRB.
20
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2349, 2349 (4th Cir. 1972) (applying
West Virginia five-year statute for breach of oral contract); compare Edwards v.
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276, 1292 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Texas two-year
tort statute) with Hand v. International Chem. Workers Union, 681 F.2d 1308, 1313
(l1th Cir. 1982) (applying Florida four-year tort statute); compare Walsh v. Boss
Linco Lines, 537 F. Supp. 363, 363-64 (D.N.J. 1981) (applying New Jersey 90-day
statute to vacate arbitration awards) with Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 861 (D.N.H. 1981) (applying New Hamp-
shire one-year statute to vacate arbitration awards).
13. Compare Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773-74
(4th Cir. 1978) (in action against union alone, Virginia's two-year tort statute ap-
plies) with Kennedy v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2349,
2349 (4th Cir. 1972) (action against both union and employer, West Virginia's five-
year contract statute applies to both defendants).
14. E.g., Kennedy v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2349, 2349 (4th Cir. 1972); Dent v. United States Postal Serv., 538 F. Supp. 1079,
1083 (S.D. Ohio 1982); see also Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv., 428 F. Supp.
45, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (undecided between oral or written contract limitations).
15. E.g., Warren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 337 (8th
Cir. 1976); Butler v. Local Union 823, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); King v. Corn Prods., 538 F. Supp. 569,
571 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
16. E.g., Washington v. Northland Marine Co., 681 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir.
1982); Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276, 1292 (5th Cir. 1982);
Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1978); De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
17. Assad v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 82-7251, slip op. at 2294 (2d Cir. Mar. 9,
1983); Flowers v. Local 2602 of the United Steel Workers, 671 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 442 (1982); see United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 74 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("employee's
claim against his union is properly characterized ... as a malpractice claim"); Lake
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 538 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (applying two-
year limitations period to recover lost wages but noting that malpractice is also a
two-year limitations period).
18. E.g., Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire Local of the Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 1982); Heritage v. Board of Educ., 447 F.
Supp. 1240, 1243-44 (D. Del. 1978); Canada v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 446 F.
Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
19. E.g., Rigby v. Roadway Express, Inc., 680 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1982);
Wilcoxen v. Kroger Food Stores, 545 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Suwan-
chai v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 861
(D.N.H. 1981); Walsh v. Boss Linco Lines, 537 F. Supp. 363, 364 (D.N.J. 1981).
20. E.g., Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1982); Lewis
v. Harbison-Walker Refractories, 542 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Collins
v. Car Carriers, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 776, 778 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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These limitation periods, with the exception of the unfair labor
practice statute, are governed by state law and vary among jurisdic-
tions.2 ' Thus, the amount of time that an employee will have to sue
for breach of the duty of fair representation depends upon the state in
which the action is brought. As a result, this federally created right,
premised on national labor policy,22 may be denied to a plaintiff in
one state while available to a plaintiff in another, even though the two
claims arose at the same time. Moreover, failure to characterize the
action consistently results in the adoption of different periods, not
only among the states, but sometimes within a particular state. 23 The
expenditure of time, money and judicial resources required to litigate
the issue of which statute of limitations is appropriate 24 could be
avoided if a uniform period were established for these claims.
This Note argues that the goals of certainty, uniformity and the
promotion of labor stability require application of a single limitations
period to all suits for breach of the duty of fair representation. Part I
examines the relationship between the duty of fair representation and
a breach of contract claim under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) 25 and endeavors to refute the argument
that the same statute of limitations must be applied to these different
causes of action. Part II analyzes various statutes of limitations avail-
able to courts when Congress has failed to provide a limitations period
21. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
22. See Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971). See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
23. Compare Hand v. International Chem. Workers Union, 681 F.2d 1308, 1313
(11th Cir. 1982) (applying Florida four-year tort statute) with Sanders v. Grand
Union Co., 541 F. Supp. 621, 625 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (applying Florida 90-day period
for actions to vacate arbitration awards); compare Kaftantzis v. D & L Transp. Co.,
531 F. Supp. 566, 570 (N.D. 111. 1982) (applying the six-month period of § 10(b) of
the NLRA) with King v. Corn Prods., 538 F. Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(applying Illinois ten-year statute for written contracts) with Keenon v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., No. 80 C 3935, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1982) (applying Illinois 90-
day period for actions to vacate arbitration awards); compare Flowers v. Local 2602
of the United Steel Workers, 671 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.) (applying New York three-
year statute for nonmedical malpractice), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 442 (1982) with
Byrne v. Buffalo Creek R.R., 536 F. Supp. 1301, 1308-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (apply-
ing New York six-year contract statute).
24. Commentators have noted that uncertainty over this issue has resulted in
extensive litigation. See Wacker, Litigation For The Union, in Basic Labor Relations
304 (PLI 1981) (issue is in such conflict that "the statute of limitations should always
be pled as a defense to a fair representation action, regardless of what the law may
appear to be"); Hickey & Murphy, supra note 1, at 16, col. 1 (duty of fair representa-
tion "has become a source of uncertainty and contention, as . . . employees, and
unions litigate and relitigate the issue of the appropriate statute of limitations for
such suits").
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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for a federal right. The Note concludes that the adoption of the six-
month period imposed by section 10(b) of the NLRA is appropriate.
I. THE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AND SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
In selecting an appropriate statute of limitations for a breach of the
duty of fair representation, courts often look to the limitations period
that is applied to a claim against an employer for violation of a
collective bargaining agreement. 26 These claims, which are autho-
rized by section 301 of the LMRA,2 7 often require proof of some of the
same elements as those in breach of duty claims. This is so because
collective bargaining agreements generally provide an exclusive mech-
anism for the resolution of employee grievances. 28 Therefore, if an
employee sues his employer under section 301 for violation of such an
agreement,2 9 he must show a lack of proper representation by the
26. See, e.g., Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773 (4th
Cir. 1978); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447-48 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Fedor v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 533 F.
Supp. 269, 272 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 687 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1982); Suwanchai v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 861 (D.N.H. 1981);
Kikos v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 526 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Sheeran v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, 524 F. Supp. 567, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
27. Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Employees have standing to sue their employers under this
provision. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962). An employee
may join the union as a defendant in a § 301 suit. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335, 343-44 (1964).
28. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 596 n.14 (1983) ("Most
collective-bargaining agreements . . . contain exclusive grievance-arbitration proce-
dures and give the union power to supervise the procedure."). The grievance proce-
dure usually consists of several steps, in each of which a union presents an employee's
grievance at progressively higher levels of management. F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri,
How Arbitration Works 120-23 (3d ed. 1973). The Bureau of National Affairs main-
tains a file of over 5000 collective bargaining agreements. Basic Patterns In Union
Contracts (BNA), at v (9th ed. 1979). In a sample of 400 contracts covering a cross
section of industry, geographical area and number of employees covered, id., all but
two of the agreements contained grievance resolution procedures, id. at 11, and 96 %
of the collective bargaining agreements sampled provided for arbitration as the final
step in the grievance procedure, id. at 15.
29. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981) ("An employee . . .must
attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by
[the collective bargaining] agreement before he may maintain a suit against his union
LABOR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
union in arbitration 30 or a failure by the union to process the griev-
ance properly. 3' Conversely, in a suit against his union, the employee
must prove that the employer breached the collective bargaining
agreement in order to establish that he has suffered actual damage as
a result of the union's breach of duty.32
In such a situation, the injured employee may elect to sue his
employer under section 301, 33 his union for breach of the duty of fair
representation, 34 or both.35 When the actions are brought together in
a "hybrid § 301/breach-of-duty suit," 36 some courts apply a single
statute of limitations to both claims.37 They reason that subjecting
both the union and the employer to liability for the same period of
or employer under § 301(a)."). The rule is designed to "protect the integrity of the
collective-bargaining process and to further that aspect of national labor policy that
encourages private rather than judicial resolution of disputes." Id. at 687; see Repub-
lic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
30. The finality of an arbitration award will be removed when the union has
breached its duty of fair representation. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S.
554, 571 (1976); see United Parcel Serv., Inc., v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61 (1981).
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967); see Warren v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 341 (8th Cir. 1976); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 449-50 & n.11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924
(1975).
32. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570 (1976); see Buchholtz v.
Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317, 327 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980);
Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851,
855 (D.N.H. 1981).
33. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962); see, e.g., McNutt
v. Airco Indus. Gases Div., 687 F.2d 539, 539-40 (1st Cir. 1982); Liotta v. National
Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Edie
v. Brundage Co., 546 F. Supp. 837, 838 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
34. Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir. 1982); see
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967); see, e.g., Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire
Local of the Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 401 (6th Cir. 1982); Howard
v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1978); Suwanchai v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 854 (D.N.H.
1981).
35. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
343-44 (1964); see, e.g., Flowers v. Local 2602 of the United Steel Workers, 671 F.2d
87, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 442 (1982); Lewis v. Harbison-Walker
Refractories, 542 F. Supp. 1381, 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Lake v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 725, 726 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
36. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 602 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting).
37. Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 448 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234,
1252 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Fedor v. Hygrade Food
Prods. Corp., 533 F. Supp. 269, 272 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 687 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1982); see
Rigby v. Roadway Express, Inc., 680 F.2d 342, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1982).
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time makes it possible to apportion damages according to the respec-
tive fault of the parties .3
Recently, however, the Supreme Court eliminated this reason as a
potential rationale for identical limitations periods by establishing the
proper apportionment of liability. In Bowen v. United States Postal
Service,39 the Court ruled that a union can be held liable only for the
increase in damages flowing from its failure to represent an employee
fairly. 40 A union, therefore, is liable for an employee's damages accru-
ing after an unfavorable arbitration award is rendered or from the
time that an arbitration award would have been rendered had the
union properly pursued the employee's grievance. 4' The union will
not be responsible for the damages caused by the employer even if the
action against the employer is time barred. 42 Thus, applying different
statutes of limitations to both claims will not affect the liability of the
union.
The employer, however, remains secondarily liable for the union's
portion of the damages if the employee cannot collect those damages
from the union. 43 If the statute of limitations bars the claim against
the union but not the employer, the employer will be liable for the
entire damage award. 44 This result, however, is unlikely because the
Supreme Court recently held, in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitch-
ell,45 that in situations in which an arbitration award has been ren-
dered the employer is subject to the statute of limitations governing
actions to vacate arbitration awards. 46 This period, which typically
38. See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447-48
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d
1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); T. Boyce, supra note
1, at 93-94; R. Gorman, supra note 2, at 725; Hickey & Murphy, supra note 1, at 16,
col. 3; Must They Be the Same?, supra note 4, at 1072-74.
The formula for damages was originally set forth by the Supreme Court in Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967):
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the em-
ployer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault of each.
Thus, damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract
should not be charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged
to the employer.
Id. at 197-98.
39. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
40. Id. at 598-99 (citing Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970)).
41. See 103 S. Ct. at 595-96; id. at 606 n.13 (White, J., dissenting).
42. The union and the employer may be jointly and severally liable if the union
affirmatively induces the employer to breach the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 605 (White, J., dissenting); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 n.18 (1967).
43. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 595 n.12 (1983).
44. See id. at 606 (White, J., dissenting).
45. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
46. Id. at 64.
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lasts three months,47 is no longer than any period to which the union
has been or is likely to be subject. Consequently, this justification
offered by the courts for applying the same statute of limitations to
breach of duty and section 301 claims is no longer compelling.
II. AN APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS PERIOD
When Congress fails to provide a limitations period for an action
pursuant to federal law, courts may either: 1) apply no limitations
period; 2) import the equitable doctrine of laches; 3) judicially create
a limitations period; 4) adopt an analogous state period; or 5) adopt
an analogous federal period.48
A. No Limitation
Placing no time limitation on breach of duty actions would guaran-
tee that all meritorious claims could be heard. Statutes of limitations,
however, serve several useful purposes. They protect potential defend-
ants from continuing liability and the necessity of defending stale
claims,49 preserve judicial integrity by helping to ensure full and fair
advocacy of claims,50 and decrease the number of suits filed, 51 thereby
47. Id. at 63 n.5; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 682.13(2) (West 1983); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 10, § 112(b) (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:24-7 (West 1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7511(a) (McKinney 1980); Tex. Stat.
Ann. art. 237 see. B (Vernon 1973). But see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1288 (West 1982)
(100 days); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 658-11 (1976) (10 days); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150C,
§ 11(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976) (30 days); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:8 (1974)
(one year).
48. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 229 (1958) (Brennan,
J., concurring); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 350 F.2d 936, 937 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 904 (1966); Note,
Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1130 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Limitation Borrowing]; Note, Disparities in Time Limitations on
Federal Causes of Action, 49 Yale L.J. 738, 744-45 (1940); see UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
49. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380
U.S. 424, 428 (1965); 1 H. Wood, A Treatise on the Limitation of Actions § 4, at 7-11
(4th ed. 1916).
50. Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal
Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 1011, 1017
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Time Bars]. The judicial system relies on adversaries to
arrive at the truth through the introduction and examination of evidence. When a
claim is stale, the adversarial system is disadvantaged by missing witnesses and faded
memories. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Chase See. Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
51. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956); Time Bars,
supra note 50, at 1016-17.
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unburdening court dockets and allowing for more effective use of
limited judicial resources. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has noted,
statutes of limitations are essential in the labor area because rapid
resolution of disputes is an important key to labor stability. 52 Courts
should therefore reject this alternative and implement a statute of
limitations53 that would further these objectives.
B. Laches
The laches defense allows courts to bar stale claims. 4 Adoption of
the doctrine of laches in this context, however, would not promote
uniformity of decision because the availability of this defense is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of a trial judge. 55 Thus,
the goal of stability in labor law might be defeated. 56 Furthermore,
laches is an equitable doctrine and should not be imported to an
action at law when a legal alternative is readily available. 57
52. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981); UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966).
53. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805).
54. Laches will bar a claim if plaintiff's unreasonable delay has prejudiced the
defendant. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 43 (1973); e.g., Goodman
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 446
U.S. 913 (1980); Adair v. Shallenberger, 119 F.2d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 1941); D.O.
Haynes & Co. v. Druggists' Circular, 32 F.2d 215, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1929).
55. The availability of a laches defense is a question "primarily addressed to the
discretion of the trial court." Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30 (1951) (per
curiam); accord Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980); see Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis
Elevator, Co., 525 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975).
56. See International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.,
350 F.2d 936, 937 (9th Cir. 1965) (rejects laches for suits arising under § 303 of the
LMRA because application of the doctrine would cause "uniform uncertainty"), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 904 (1966); Byrne v. Buffalo Creek R.R., 536 F. Supp. 1301, 1309
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) ("doctrine of laches should not be applied to defeat an otherwise
timely claim absent extraordinary circumstances").
57. See Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 822-23 (6th
Cir. 1981); Whipple v. Dickey, 401 N.E.2d 787, 789 n.1 (Ind. App. 1980); McNulty
v. Heitman, 600 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Mo. App. 1980); R. Newman, Equity and Law: A
Comparative Study 246 (1961). Because a union cannot reinstate a discharged em-
ployee, most breach of duty claims seek damages in the form of backpay, which is an
action at law. See, e.g., Ballard v. El Dorado Tire Co., 512 F.2d 901, 904-05 (5th
Cir. 1975); Sanders v. Grand Union Co., 541 F. Supp. 621, 622 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851,
854 (D.N.H. 1981); Bates v. American Tara Corp., 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2149, 2149
(N.D. Ga. 1981). Moreover, since the merger of law and equity, courts generally look
to the statute of limitations for an estimate of the reasonable period for laches. D.O.
Haynes & Co. v. Druggists' Circular, 32 F.2d 215, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1929); Rakstiene
v. Kroulaidis, 33 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 339 N.E.2d 447, 451 (1975); D. Dobbs,
supra note 54, at 43; 2 J. Pomeroy, Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 419b (5th ed.
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C. Judicial Invention
The Supreme Court refused to invent a uniform period for section
301 suits when it was urged to devise a period that would be applica-
ble in all jurisdictions.-" The Court in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp.59 indicated that Congress is aware of the judicial practice of
adopting analogous periods, so "it cannot be fairly inferred that when
Congress left § 301 without a uniform time limitation, it did so in the
expectation that the courts would invent one."' 60 Unless and until the
Supreme Court elects to devise a uniform statute of limitations for
breach of the duty of fair representation, lower courts should refrain
from choosing this alternative because it would likely result in further
inconsistencies among jurisdictions.
D. Adopting an Analogous State Statute
1. Overlooking the Federal Interest
Federal courts often borrow analogous state statutes of limitations
for federal rights without limitations periods6 1 on the theory that
when Congress enacts legislation without such a period, it does so
with the expectation that courts will borrow an analogous state statute
of limitations. 12 This procedure, however, is by no means mandated.6 3
Moreover, the duty of fair representation was not expressly created by
Congress; 64 rather, it was judicially derived from the NLRA several
years after that statute was enacted.6 5 It cannot be said, therefore,
1941). But see Groesbeck v. Morgan, 206 N.Y. 385, 389, 99 N.E. 1046, 1047 (1912)
(laches may bar claim for equitable relief brought within statute of limitations).
58. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1966).
59. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
60. Id. at 703.
61. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981) (state
period for § 301 claim); Flowers v. Local 2602 of the United Steel Workers, 671 F.2d
87, 91 (2d Cir.) (state period for breach of duty claims), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 442
(1982); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350
F.2d 936, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1965) (state periods for § 303 claims), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 904 (1966). Federal courts have borrowed state statutes of limitations since the
1800's. See, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman,
28 U.S. 167, 171-72, 3 Pet. 269, 277-78 (1830).
62. E.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
63. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 65 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting); Assad v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 82-7251, slip op. at 2292 (2d Cir. Mar.
9, 1983); Time Bars, supra note 50, at 1038-42.
64. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
65. Section 9(a) of the NLRA was enacted in 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 9(a), 49
Stat. 449, 453, while the duty of fair representation was not judicially applied to the
NLRA until 1953 in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953).
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that Congress impliedly acceded to the judicial practice of borrowing
state statutes of limitation. 68
Nevertheless, lower courts do apply state limitations periods to
breach of duty claims, usually citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Hoosier Cardinal for support. 67 Hoosier Cardinal, however, involved
only a section 301 suit and not a breach of duty action against the
union.6A Moreover, a breach of duty claim is not a section 301 suit. It
has a source of jurisdiction independent of that of section 301.119
Although an employee may elect to join his union as a defendant
when he brings a section 301 claim, 70 jurisdiction for the claim against
the union is derived from section 1337 of title 28 of the United States
Code.71 This section provides that suits based on statutes regulating
commerce may be brought in federal court. 72
Application of state statutes of limitations to section 301 claims may
well be appropriate because state legislatures are familiar with breach
of contract actions.73 They are unlikely, however, to have been ex-
posed to the duty of fair representation, which is exclusively a federal
right. "State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with
national interests in mind,"' 74 and although federal courts may exer-
cise discretion to reject analogous state periods 75 that would impede
66. Limitation Borrowing, supra note 48, at 1133-34.
67. E.g., Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,
425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Suwanchai v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 857-58 (D.N.H.
1981).
68. 383 U.S. at 698-99.
69. Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276, 1283 (5th Cir. 1982); De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 283 n.1 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 854 & n.3 (D.N.H. 1982).
70. See supra note 35.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Although some cases clearly hold
that federal court jurisdiction of a breach of duty claim derives from § 1337, e.g.,
Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir. 1982); Beriault v.
Local 40, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 501 F.2d 258, 264-65 (9th
Cir. 1974), other courts have taken jurisdiction based on § 301, e.g., Newton v. Local
801 Frigidaire Local of the Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 401 (6th Cir.
1982); Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451,
453 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979). The distinction may be due to a failure by courts to separate
the breach of duty claim from the § 301 claim. Analysis of this issue, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
73. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.7 (1966).
74. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
75. See id. (action arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 (1976)); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224-25
& n.6 (1958) (state unseaworthiness statutes of limitations may not be applied if they
interfere with federal rights provided by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976)).
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the policies of the NLRA, many fail to exercise that discretion ade-
quately. 76
Furthermore, even the Court in Hoosier Cardinal recognized that
some problems, "vital to the implementation of federal labor pol-
icy," 77 may require the "application of ... rules on timeliness" other
than those provided in analogous state statutes.78 Enforcement of a
union's duty of fair representation, vital to the labor policy of protect-
ing employees, 79 is one of the situations that commands a departure
from judicial reliance on state limitations periods.
2. Lack of Uniformity
The more substantial difficulty with applying a state statute of
limitations is the lack of uniformity among states. Many different state
causes of action are used by analogy by federal courts in their charac-
terization of a duty of fair representation claim, resulting in the
adoption of disparate statutes of limitations.8 0 As long as a uniform
federal statute of limitations is not applied, the total number of state
limitations statutes that might be invoked is fifty times the number of
possible characterizations. 81
76. For example, one district court simply applied a thirty-day statute to vacate
arbitration awards to the employee's claim against her union without discussing how
the statute was analogous to the breach of duty. Francis v. Koppers Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1227, 1231 (D. Md. 1982). Plaintiff had filed her claim just 117 days after she
had been informed by her union that her grievance had been dropped. Id. at 1229.
Only one year earlier, the same court had rejected the statute because it abridged the
plaintiffs federal rights. Fox v. Mitchell Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1346, 1349-50
(D. Md.), aff'd mem., 671 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1981).
77. 383 U.S. at 701.
78. Id. at 705 n.7.
79. Section I of the NLRA reads in part: "Experience has proved that protection
by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment [and] interruption." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
Section 1(b) of the LMRA states that: "It is the purpose ... of this chapter, in order
to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of ...
employees [and) to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with
labor organizations." Id. § 141(b). As one commentator has noted, "[t]he employees'
correlative right to fair representation is one of the three important safeguards the
law affords individual workers against abuse of power by a union." Cox, supra note
3, at 151. The duty of fair representation should serve as a means of protecting
employees through regulation of union power. Wellington, Union Democracy and
Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327,
1357-61 (1958).
80. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
81. The number of possibilities is reduced by the fact that some states do not have
separate statutes of limitations for every possible characterization. For example, only
42 states have statutes to vacate arbitration awards. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63 n.5 (1981). The applicable statutes may vary in length. For
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Furthermore, collective bargaining agreements may cover employ-
ees working in several states. 82 Consequently, two employees under
the same agreement with the same relationship to their union may
well have differing time periods within which to bring breach of duty
claims. In Hoosier Cardinal, Justice White, dissenting from the deci-
sion to apply analogous state statutes to section 301 claims, noted that
in such a situation "[s]imple justice dictates . . . that the right of
employees in different States to assert their federal claim should be
equally available. '" 8 3
Despite these shortcomings, many courts continue to rely on the
adoption of state limitations periods for breach of duty claims. A
comparison of the federal breach of duty claim with the state claims
for which the statutes were designed, however, reveals no similarity.
Moreover, an examination of the limitations periods themselves dem-
onstrates that they are inappropriate for use with a breach of duty
claim.
a. A contract statute of limitations
Until recently, several courts applied a breach of contract statute of
limitations to actions against unions on the basis of the relationship
between breach of duty claims and section 301 claims.8 4 But in United
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,8 5 the Supreme Court decided that a
contract statute of limitations is no longer the most appropriate period
to apply to a section 301 action. 86 Moreover, regardless of the relation-
actions to vacate arbitration awards, compare Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 658-11 (1976) (10
days) with N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:8 (1974) (one year). For liability created by
statute, compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106 (1974) (three years) with Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2305.07 (Page 1981) (six years). For tort actions, compare Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5526 (Vernon 1982) (two years) with N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
508:4 (1974 & Supp. 1981) (six years).
82. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137, 1140-
41 (9th Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Libby-Owens-Ford Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195, 1197
(3d Cir.) (single bargaining unit consisting of employees in six states and Ottawa,
Canada), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Local 1325, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 1194, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court denied enforcement of NLRB
ruling that bargaining unit may be determined on basis of state in which employees
work); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 734, 736 (1962) (bargaining unit of
employees from three states); Barr's Jewelers, 131 N.L.R.B. 235, 238 (1961) (bar-
gaining unit of employees from two states).
83. 383 U.S. at 711-12 (White, J., dissenting); see Assad v. Mount Sinai Hosp.,
No. 82-7251, slip op. at 2291 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 1983).
84. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981); Warren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544
F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1976); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971).
85. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
86. Id. at 62.
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ship between the claims, 7 a breach of the duty of fair representation
and a breach of contract are not analogous because the duty of fair
representation is not contractual; 88 it extends to employees of the
bargaining unit who are not union members and thus have no con-
tractual relationship with the union.89 Indeed, the duty does not even
arise from the collective bargaining agreement; it is a federally im-
posed obligation. °0
b. Vacation of arbitration award statutes
In Mitchell, the Court held that in a section 301 action against an
employer following grievance arbitration, the state statute of limita-
tions to vacate an arbitration award is more appropriate than a
statute of limitations for breach of contract. 91 Some courts have taken
Mitchell further, requiring that state vacation of arbitration award
statutes be applied to breach of duty claims against unions." No
union, however, was represented before the Supreme Court in Mitch-
ell,9 3 and the Court's decision should therefore not be applied to
breach of the duty of fair representation claims.
Application of vacation of arbitration award statutes of limitations
to breach of duty claims is inappropriate. Regardless of whether the
action is brought alone or with a section 301 claim, no arbitrator will
87. See supra pt. I.
88. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63 (1981); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 202 n.4 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); Newton v. Local 801
Frigidaire Local of the Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir.
1982); Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.
1978); T. Boyce, supra note 1, at 92; Must They Be the Same?, supra note 4, at 1064-
66.
89. Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.
1978); see Cox, supra note 3, at 157; Wellington, supra note 79, at 1335.
90. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
91. 451 U.S. at 62, 64.
92. See, e.g., Wilcoxen v. Kroger Food Stores, 545 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) ("the [Mitchell] court held that the appropriate limitations period ...
against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation is the period during which
a party could move under state law for vacation of an arbitration award"); Fedor v.
Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 533 F. Supp. 269, 272 (E.D. Pa.) ("United Parcel
requires courts to apply the same statute of limitations to both an employee's claim
against his employer and his claim against his union"), afj'd, 687 F.2d 8 (3d Cir.
1982); Keenon v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 80 C 3935, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
10, 1982) ("in an action brought by an employee against [a union] courts must apply
the state statute of limitations . . . to vacate an arbitration award"). Courts have
disagreed whether a vacation of arbitration award statute is applicable when no
arbitration award has been rendered. Compare id. at 3 (statute applicable without
arbitration award) with King v. Corn Prods., 538 F. Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(statute not applicable).




have rendered a decision on the breach of duty claim itself.94 The
labor policies favoring arbitration are therefore not implicated by
application of a non-arbitration statute of limitations to a breach of
duty claim.
Labor policy favors grievance arbitration because it allows the
parties to settle disputes privately without resort to costly litigation,
which heightens the adversarial nature of the conflict, 95 or to work
stoppages, which halt production.9 When a section 301 action calls
an arbitrator's award into question,97 the judicial policy of protecting
the integrity of the arbitration process requires that only a brief time
period be allowed for collateral attacks on the award.9" The claim
94. Id. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
95. Arbitration proceedings are more informal and less costly than court litiga-
tion because they may take place in the manner and at the location agreed to by the
parties. See F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, supra note 28, at 8-10, 22. Arbitration may be
conducted without attorneys, briefs or other formalities. Id. at 23; see R. Gorman,
supra note 2, at 543; C. Updegraff, Arbitration and Labor Relations 21 (1970).
96. See F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, supra note 28, at 5; R. Gorman, .supra note 2, at
605-06; C. Updegraff, supra note 95, at 22-23.
97. In a suit against an employer, an employee generally seeks to obtain the same
relief that was denied him by the arbitrator. To award such relief would effectively
vacate the arbitration award. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61
(1981); Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Sheeran v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, 524 F. Supp. 567, 570
(E.D. Pa. 1981). Courts disagree whether a vacation of arbitration award statute
should be applicable when the employee's claim was dismissed by the union prior to
arbitration. Compare King v. Corn Prods., 538 F. Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(rule of Mitchell inapplicable absent arbitration award) and Lake v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 725, 728 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (same) with Martin v. Pullman
Standard, 538 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (Mitchell applies even though
grievance is dismissed prior to arbitration) and Lincoln v. District 9 of the Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists, 539 F. Supp. 1346, 1348-49 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (same).
The better-reasoned approach is to apply the vacation of arbitration awards
statute of limitations even though no arbitration decision is rendered. The period
should begin to run when the employee receives notice of the union's refusal to
continue processing the grievance, and he has exhausted any internal union appeals
procedure, as is required by Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 692 (1981). First, the
employer accepts a grievance resolution provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment as the exclusive means of dispute resolution. He should not be required to police
the union's duty to ensure that all meritorious grievances are brought to arbitration.
Second, once the employee has received notice that the union will not process his
grievance further, he has a decision that is as final and binding as an arbitrator's
award. Arbitration is the final step of grievance procedures, not a separate means of
dispute resolution. See Francis v. Koppers Co., 548 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (D. Md.
1982); Keenon v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 80 C 3935, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
10, 1982); Fields v. Babcock & Wilcox, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3150, 3151 (W.D. Pa.
1981); Hickey & Murphy, supra note 1, at 16, col. 3-4. But see Assad v. Mount Sinai
Hosp., No. 82-7251, slip op. at 2281-82, 2288-89 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 1983) (applying
six-month period of § 10(b) to § 301 action because employee's claim was never
arbitrated).
98. Section 302(d) of the LMRA provides that: "Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
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against the union, however, does not involve a challenge to an arbitra-
tion award.99 Rather, it challenges the union's representation of an
employee during the grievance process. 0 An employee may prevail
on his breach of duty claim while the arbitration award remains
intact.' 01 Clearly, the policies supporting application of an abbrevi-
ated statute of limitations to section 301 actions that challenge arbitra-
tion awards do not apply to breach of duty claims.
Moreover, the three-month duration of most vacation of arbitration
award statutes 0 2 limits the time during which parties involved in
arbitration can challenge the arbitration award. 0 3 The duty of fair
representation claim, however, is a new and different claim that does
not arise until after the arbitration decision has or should have been
rendered. 0 4 Until the grievance procedures are completed, the union
grievance disputes." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). To further this policy, courts will
compel arbitration of a grievance that is covered by the arbitration clause without
looking to the merits of the claim. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 568 (1960). To be excepted from arbitration, the dispute must be expressly
excluded from the established grievance provision. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960). A court will not disturb the
decision of an arbitrator for errors of law or fact. See United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); see also United Parcel Serv., Inc.
v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981) (the grievance system may become unworkable
if arbitration decisions could be challenged six years later).
99. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
100. A union's duty requires that it not process a grievance in a perfunctory
fashion. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); see Hines v. Local Union No. 377,
Chauffeurs, 506 F.2d 1153, 1156 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 572 (1976). Because an employee is
usually powerless to invoke the arbitration process on his own, see supra note 28, the
grievance procedure, which is preferred by national labor policy as a substitute "for
tests of strength between contending forces," John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 549 (1964), can be effective only if a union maintains its duty of fair
representation.
101. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102. See supra note 47.
103. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 658-9 (1976) ("[T]he court may make an order
vacating the award, upon the application of any party to the arbitration."); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:8 (1974) ("At any time within one year after the award is made
any party to the arbitration may apply. . . for an order. . . vacating the award.").
104. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 & n.3 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Supreme Court, in Bowen v. United
States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983), confirmed this by holding the union liable
only for damages accruing after an arbitration decision. Id. at 595-96. See supra note
41 and accompanying text. Failure to process a meritorious grievance through arbi-
tration may also be a breach of the duty of fair representation although an employee
does not have "an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration." Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); see, e.g., Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d
1123, 1127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); Milstead v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978); Ruzicka
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acts as the employee's exclusive representative. 0 5 To pursue the claim
against his union, the employee must obtain independent counsel that
was probably not involved in the previous action. 06 Obviously, the
purposes of statutes of limitations in general 10 7 are not served by
applying such a short period to the breach of duty claim. Rather than
barring only stale claims, the vacation of arbitration awards statute is
likely to bar meritorious claims.
Furthermore, because three months may be an insufficient time to
evaluate the merits of a duty of fair representation claim, plaintiffs
may file actions prematurely to be certain that their potentially valid
claims are preserved. 08 If the time limitations period is longer, the
number of unmeritorious claims that are filed may be reduced. 0 9
c. Malpractice and other tort statutes of limitations
In Mitchell, Justice Stevens suggested that the appropriate period
governing a fair representation claim is a malpractice statute of limi-
tations. 110 He analogized the union that breaches its duty to a "lawyer
who negligently allows the statute of limitations to run on his client's
valid claim [and] may be liable to his client even though the original
defendant no longer has any exposure.""' But this analogy is not
appropriate. A union is not liable if an employee can no longer
recover against his employer. 112 When the statute of limitations has
run on the claim against the employer, damages are lost and are not
recoverable from the union. "3
v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975); Pesola v. Inland Tool &
Mfg., 423 F. Supp. 30, 35 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
105. See supra note 28.
106. Fox v. Mitchell Transp. Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (D. Md.), afj'd mem.,
671 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1981); see C. Summers & R. Rabin, The Rights of Union
Members 131 (1979). It is not uncommon for no record to be kept of the hearing, C.
Updegraff, supra note 95, at 259, thus making it more difficult for independent
counsel to assist the employee in preparing a case against the union.
107. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
108. Fox v. Mitchell Transp. Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (D. Md.), aff'd mem.,
671 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1981).
109. Very few plaintiffs have been able to sustain the burden of proof necessary
for a breach of duty claim. See Sachs & Gurewitz, supra note 1, at 526. The necessity
of defending meritless claims depletes a union's treasury, thereby detracting from its
ability to represent its employees adequately. See Speech by John S. Irving, General
Counsel to NLRB, concerning the Duty of Fair Representation (Apr. 27, 1979),
reprinted in 1979 Lab. Rel. Y.B. 345, 346.
110. 451 U.S. at 74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
111. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
112. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
113. Id. In Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976), a case arising under the Railway Labor Act, the court
held that the union was liable because it had allowed the statute of limitations to run
on the employees valid claim. Id. at 561-62. The case is distinguishable, however,
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In addition, the relationship between a union and an employee is
not analogous to an attorney-client relationship. Rank and file em-
ployees who volunteer their time to serve as union stewards cannot
realistically be expected to meet the exacting standards of a fiduci-
ary. " 4 Furthermore, an analogy to a malpractice statute suggests that
the duty of fair representation may be breached by ordinary negli-
gence, when actually something greater, perhaps gross negligence, is
needed." 15 Moreover, not only do limitations periods for malpractice
vary among states, but in some states uncertainty exists as to which
statute of limitations applies to a malpractice claim; "1 uniformity is
frustrated again.
because the employee could have presented his grievance to the Railroad Adjustment
Board on his own had the union timely informed him that it was dropping his claim.
Id.
114. Curtis v. United Transp. Union, Nos. 82-1450, 82-1458, slip op. at 2 (8th
Cir. Feb. 22, 1983); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight Corp., 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d
Cir. 1981); Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); Vladeck, The Conflict between the Duty of Fair
Representation and the Limitations on Union Self-Government, in The Duty of Fair
Representation 45 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977); Irving, NLRB Policy on Union's Duty of
Fair Representation, 1979 Lab. Rel. Y.B. 341, 342-43; Sachs & Gurewitz, supra note
1, at 528-29. Although the fiduciary "label should not necessarily control the legal
relationships of the parties," Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971), to some extent labels may become self
fulfilling, L. Krasner & L. Ullman, Behavior Influence and Personality 4-5 (1973).
115. The standard of care required by the duty of fair representation is uncertain.
Sachs & Gurewitz, supra note 1, at 528. See generally Summers, The Individual
Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Repre-
sentation?, in The Duty of Fair Representation 60 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977). An
employee must prove more than negligence to show a breach of the duty of fair
representation. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249,
1255 (8th Cir. 1980); Dente v. International Org. of Masters, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10,
12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181,
183 (4th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir.
1972); Hiatt v. New York Cent. R.R., 444 F.2d 1397, 1398 (7th Cir. 1971); Bazarte
v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970); Larry v. Penn Truck
Aids, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708, 717 (E.D. Pa. 1982). A showing of mere negligence is not
enough to prove a breach of duty before the NLRB. General Truck Drivers Union,
Local 692, 209 N.L.R.B. 446, 448 (1974).
Some courts have found, however, that negligent conduct in handling an employ-
ee's grievance may be equivalent to arbitrary or perfunctory conduct, which is a
breach of duty. E.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir.
1975); Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., 423 F. Supp. 30, 35 (E.D. Mich. 1976); see
Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957, 580 F.2d 232,
235 (6th Cir. 1978). Other courts have held that an employee must show gross
negligence, bad faith or intentional misconduct by his union. E.g., Hoffman v.
Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1981) (intentional misconduct); Whitten v.
Anchor Motor Freight, 521 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (6th Cir. 1975) (bad faith), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976); Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2663, 2667
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (gross negligence).
116. See, e.g., Yazzle v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan & Tenner, P.C., 593 F.2d 100, 102-
05 (9th Cir. 1979); Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774, 776 (W. Va. 1980); Goodstein
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Adopting other tort statutes revives the difficulty of characterizing
the breach of duty claim.11 7 It has been variously characterized as an
action for lost wages,"" a miscellaneous tort action with a catchall
limitations period, " 9 and a liability imposed by statute. 20 These char-
acterizations create wide discrepancies in the duration of the limita-
tions period.121
Furthermore, many tort statutes are three years or greater in
length, 22 Co-workers have a strong interest in the swift resolution of
actions against their union so that they can gauge the effectiveness of
their collective bargaining representative. 12 3 Consequently, permit-
ting a limitation period of three years or longer would serve to frus-
trate the national policy in favor of labor stability.124
E. Adopting an Analogous Federal Statute
When federal rights are created without limitations periods, the
fifth alternative a court may select is to borrow an analogous federal
statute of limitations. A federal cause of action analogous to the
v. Weinberg, 219 Va. 105, 110, 245 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1978). See generally Note,
Choice of Statute of Limitations in Attorney Malpractice Cases, 1976 Ariz. St. L.J.
613.
117. See Tuma v. American Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178, 1183-84 (D.N.J. 1973);
T. Boyce, supra note 1, at 91; R. Gorman, supra note 2, at 725.
118. Lake v. Martin Marietta Corp., 538 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
119. E.g., Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d
771, 774 (4th Cir. 1978); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir.
1973).
120. E.g., Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire Local of the Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 1982); Heritage v. Board of Educ., 447 F.
Supp. 1240, 1243-44 (D. Del. 1978); Canada v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 446 F.
Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
121. Compare Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire Local of the Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, 684 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 1982) (Ohio six-year liability created by
statute) with Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 168 (6th Cir.) (Michigan
three-year catchall limitation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) with Lake v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 538 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (Florida two-year
action to recover lost wages).
122. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(o) (West 1982) (four years); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 600.5805(8) (Supp. 1982) (three years); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4
(Supp. 1981) (six years); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.16.080(2) (1962) (three years).
123. Because the existence of a collective bargaining agreement may bar the
certification of a new union or the decertification of the existing union for up to three
years, R. Gorman, supra note 2, at 54, employees have an interest in knowing the
results of a duty of fair representation suit as soon as possible.
124. The contract bar rule was designed to provide stability in bargaining rela-
tionships. See id. The Board, however, may decertify a union or waive the contract
bar rule when the union has breached its duty of fair representation. Independent
Metal Workers Union, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577-78 (1964).
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breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice.
Under section 10(b) of the NLRA,125 a party must file such charges
within six months of the occurrence of the act. 20 The NLRB considers
a breach of the duty of fair representation to be an unfair labor
practice. 27 Thus, when the claim is brought in that forum, the section
10(b) limitation applies.
Although section 10(b) was not drafted with the duty of fair repre-
sentation in mind, 12 8 the period is nevertheless indicative of congres-
sional attitudes toward labor dispute resolution. As Justice Stewart
noted in Mitchell, "[tihe time limitation reflects the balance drawn by
Congress . . . between the interests of employees in redressing griev-
ances and 'vindicati[ng] [their] statutory rights,' " and the goal of
labor stability which the NLRA was designed to promote. 2 9 Accord-
ingly, Justice Stewart suggested "the adoption of § 10(b) of the NLRA
as the appropriate limitations period" for hybrid section 301-breach of
duty actions.13 Subsequently, several courts have used that limita-
tions period for breach of duty suits. 131
Adoption of the section 10(b) limitation for breach of duty suits
would provide national uniformity. Parties to a multi-state agreement
would be certain that the duration of their exposure in each state
would be the same.132 The certainty would increase a union's financial
stability, allowing it to serve its members more effectively in further-
125. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
126. Id.
127. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether every breach
of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice. United Parcel Serv., Inc.
v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67 n.3 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
128. Section 10(b) was enacted in 1947. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub.
L. No. 80-101, § 102, 61 Stat. 136, 146. The duty of fair representation was not held
applicable to the NLRA until 1953 in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337
(1953). United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 76 n.9 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
129. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted); accord Assad v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 82-7251,
slip op. at 2290 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 1983).
130. 451 U.S. at 71 (Stewart, J., concurring). It is noteworthy that the majority in
Mitchell did not reject the § 10(b) limitation, it merely "decline[d] to consider [the]
argument since it was not raised by either of the parties." Id. at 60 n.2. Justice
Blackmun also issued a concurring opinion, in which he stated that he found Justice
Stewart's analysis persuasive but "resolution of the § 10(b) question properly should
await the development of a full adversarial record." Id. at 65 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
131. E.g., Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 99-100 (6th Cir. 1982);
Weller v. G.M.W. (Glendenning Motorways, Inc.), 548 F. Supp. 560, 562 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Zahnow v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 544 F. Supp. 553, 557-58 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Lewis v. Harbison-Walker Refractories, 542 F. Supp. 1381, 1383-84 (N.D.
Ind. 1982); Jarnigan v. Teamsters Local 519, 548 F. Supp. 25, 27 (E.D. Tenn. 1982);
Bates v. American Tara Corp., 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2149, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
132. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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ance of national labor objectives, 133 and employees in each state
would have equal time to vindicate their federal rights. Moreover,
because the section 10(b) limitation applies to most labor disputes that
arise in the industrial setting,13 4 unions and employees alike are more
apt to have been exposed to it than other statutes of limitations. This
may decrease the likelihood that an employee will inadvertently wait
beyond the six-month period before seeking advice or that a union will
accidentally dispose of evidence necessary for its defense before the
six-month period has expired.
Applying the section 10(b) limitation to a breach of duty of fair
representation suit in federal court has been met with the criticism
that Congress structured the limitation in light of the special consider-
ations applicable to unfair labor practice claims filed with the
NLRB. 135 As one court has stated, the "time bar must be viewed in
light of the unique mandate and functions of the Board [which has]
the responsibility of preventing unfair labor practices. . . . The §
10(b) time bar was enacted to ensure that the Board's jurisdiction
could be exercised before those disputes became stale." 130 The premise
of this criticism is that the NLRB handles many cases that require
rapid resolution because they involve instances in which production
has ceased, such as a strike or boycott. 137 These disputes may be
continual; therefore, immediate intervention is desirable. 38 Yet, cer-
133. When a union knows the limitations period has expired, it can divert re-
sources that were set aside for its defen2eto use for employees. Moreover, the union
will not be required to litigate the issue of the appropriate limitations period.
Financial stability is important because without it a union's performance as collective
bargaining representative may be hindered. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
103 S. Ct. 588, 602 (1983) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (back-
pay should not be charged to a union because "limited union funds" need protection);
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (punitive
damages should not be awarded for breach of the duty of fair representation because
they could "impair the financial stability of unions and unsettle the careful balance of
individual and collective interests"); Irving, supra note 114, at 342 (damage awards
can have a severe impact on the viablility of unions).
134. The § 10(b) limitation is applicable to all unfair labor practice claims
brought before the NLRB. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). When an event is arguably an
unfair labor practice in violation of § 8 of the NLRA, "the States as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
135. Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276, 1292 (5th Cir. 1982);
Flowers v. Local 2602 of the United Steel Workers, 671 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 442 (1982); Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local 1973, 528 F. Supp. 851, 859 (D.N.H. 1981).
136. Suwanchai v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1973, 528 F. Supp.
851, 859 (D.N.H. 1981) (emphasis in original).
137. See id.
138. One district court has therefore rejected the § 10(b) limitation because "[a]
duty of fair representation suit. . . presents an entirely different situation . . . .The
alleged wrong is over and done with; the dispute is not on-going." Id.
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tain unfair labor practices to which the section 10(b) limitation is
equally applicable, such as a prohibition of employee solicitation of
union support during nonworking time in nonworking areas, do not
disrupt production. 39 Clearly, the need for rapid resolution by the
NLRB is not as great in such a situation. 140
Just as the section 10(b) limitation applies when a breach of duty
claim is brought before the NLRB,14 1 so should it in a federal or state
court. The procedural differences between the NLRB and a federal or
state court do not warrant abandonment of the policies underlying
section 10(b) when the claim is not brought before the NLRB.14 2 As
the Supreme Court has noted, section 10(b) was designed to "bar
litigation over past events 'after records have been destroyed, wit-
nesses have gone elsewhere, and recollections of the events in question
have become dim and confused,' . . . and of course to stabilize exist-
ing bargaining relationships."1 43 These purposes are not unique to a
particular forum. Moreover, although all statutes of limitations are
designed to bar stale claims, only the section 10(b) limitation was also
designed to promote labor stability. Additionally, by enacting section
10(b) Congress sought to limit the amount of backpay awarded. 144
Allowing employees in federal court a substantially longer period to
bring breach of the duty of fair representation claims than employees
139. Restrictions on employee communication may violate § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.
See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1978).
140. Certain cases are given priority by the NLRA, and are set forth in § 10(1)-
(m). 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)-(m) (1976). Section 10(l) gives priority to cases involving
illegal strikes, secondary boycotts and picketing, and § 10(m) gives priority to cases of
discrimination against employees designed to encourage or discourage unionism. Id.
An important criterion the NLRB considers in giving priority to a particular case is
the need for an injunction. See National Labor Relations Board Casehandling Man-
ual, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings 11,740-40.1 (1975).
141. Koppers Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 517, 517 (1967).
142. See Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1982);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936,
937-38 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 904 (1966). The major distinction
between the two forums for the breach of duty lies in the scope of jurisdiction and the
remedial power. T. Boyce, supra note 1, at 83-85; see R. Gorman, supra note 2, at
721-28. The NLRB does not have jurisdiction over an employer unless his breach of
contract is also an unfair labor practice; see Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local
Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 186-88 (1971); therefore, an
employee might not receive full relief. The NLRB's damage award is also limited to
backpay, whereas courts may award consequential damages. T. Boyce, supra note 1,
at 83. When the breach of duty claim is brought before the NLRB, however, the case
is prosecuted by the NLRB's general counsel, and the employee has no litigation
expenses. Id. at 84.
143. Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 419 (1960)
(citations omitted).
144. H.R. Conf. Rep't. No. 510, H.R. Rep. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 53
(1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, at 505, 557 (1948).
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before the NLRB may undermine this congressional purpose by in-
creasing the amount of backpay for which the union is liable.
The right of an employee to be fairly represented by his union is
derived from the policy of the NLRA. 145 The time bar in section 10(b)
of the NLRA was intended to limit the rights provided by the Act. 14
Because, as the Supreme Court has noted, "it is the entire Act, and not
merely one portion of it, which embodies 'the definitive statement of
national policy,' "147 the section 10(b) limitation is particularly appro-
priate for breach of duty suits.
The six-month period would allow plaintiffs adequate time to assess
the merits of their claims 148 and provide defendants repose within a
reasonable period while helping to decrease the case load in federal
courts.149 Its application would obviate the need for borrowing state
limitations periods and avoid the problems involved with inconsistent
characterization of the claim. 50 Its brevity, uniformity and certainty
counsel its consideration when federal courts borrow a limitations
period for breach of duty suits.
CONCLUSION
Fair representation is a federal right that should be equally avail-
able to all employees represented by a union. The absence of an
express statute of limitations prevents proper enforcement of this right
because courts inconsistently apply various statutes of limitations.
Only by applying a uniform period, such as section 10(b) of the
NLRA, can courts assure that employees will receive adequate redress
when their union breaches the duty of fair representation.
Andrew P. Marks
145. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
146. Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 429 (1960).
147. Id. at 418 n.7.
148. See supra notes 108-09.
149. See supra notes 49-51.
150. See supra notes 14-20, 117.
